09 April 2001

 

Sylvia MacEachern

3271 Old Almonte Rd.

R.R. #2

Carp, ON                                                               

K0A 1L0

 

Judicial Conduct Committee

The Canadian Judicial Council

112 Kent Street

Ottawa, ON

K1A 0W8 

 

 

Dear Sir or Madame:  Reference Her Majesty the Queen v. Jacques Leduc

 

1.          I understand that correspondence dated 04 April 2001 which I addressed to the Ontario Judicial Council regarding judicial misconduct has been forwarded to you because the two justices in question are judges of the Superior Court of Justice.  I am therefore formally redirecting my allegations to the Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee with the Canadian Judicial Council. 

 

2.          As a Roman Catholic and editor of The Orator, an Ottawa-based periodical published by and for Roman Catholics, I was in attendance for five weeks of the above referenced trial.  Subsequently I am contacting your council to request an official investigation into what, I respectfully submit, was the judicial misconduct of the two judges who presided at that trial, Justice Colin McKinnon and Justice James Chadwick.

 

3.          Jacques Leduc, a lawyer and, in the Roman Catholic Church, canon lawyer, was charged with 16 counts of sexual exploitation [s.151; s.153(1)(a) x 3; s. 153(1) (b) x 3; s. 212(4)] against three young males.  The trial commenced in Cornwall, Ontario, 16 January 2001, before the Honourable Justice Colin McKinnon.  Counsel for the Crown was Shelly Hallett.  Counsel for the accused was Steven Skurka.  Commencing 21 February 2001, a motion for stay was heard by Justice James Chadwick.  A stay was granted 01 March 2001.

 

4.          The said trial made a mockery of justice and gives credence to the growing public concern that we have a biassed judiciary which sympathises with sexual predators and is predisposed to negate or minimize the mental, physical and spiritual damage done to young males who are sodomized and/or otherwise sexual molested.  I respectfully submit that this will further deter the already reluctant male victims of sex abuse from coming forward, thus putting countless other young males at risk.

 

5.          According to Justice Chadwick, the trial of Jacques Leduc was stayed due to “wilful” non-disclosure of the Crown.  I respectfully submit that the charge of “wilful” non-disclosure was attributable to the bias of the judges and was based solely on hearsay, speculation and theorizing.  Furthermore, I respectfully submit that because of this judicial misconduct a suspected Roman Catholic paedophile is now at large in the Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall.


 

 

6.          Justice Colin McKinnon :  Justice Colin McKinnon failed to recuse himself despite a grave conflict of interest.  That said conflict stemmed from Justice McKinnon’s extensive prior involvement with the Cornwall Police Service and its former Chief, Claude Shaver.  With regard to the latter (Shaver), I refer specifically to Justice McKinnon’s legal involvement regarding the 1993 actions of Constable Perry Dunlop and those of the defendant Jacques Leduc.  I respectfully submit that, due to this serious conflict of interest and bias, Justice Colin McKinnon was predisposed to find Jacques Leduc, an accused paedophile, “not guilty” or to otherwise acquit him.  Finally, I respectfully submit that the following conduct was demonstrative of Justice McKinnon’s serious judicial misconduct and bias:  

 

a.  Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself (ref:  Appendix A para 1);

b.  Justice Colin McKinnon removed himself from the motion to stay only after a witness confronted him with concrete evidence of his, McKinnon’s, serious conflict of interest (ref:  Appendix A para 2);

c.  Justice McKinnon willfully attempted to feign ignorance of Perry Dunlop (ref:  Appendix A para 3);

d.  Justice McKinnon denied the victims their right to trial by jury (ref:  Appendix A para 4);

e.  Justice McKinnon permitted an application for stay to proceed which was based solely on the benign contact of a victim’s mother with former Constable Perry Dunlop (ref:  Appendix A para 5); and

f.  Justice McKinnon allowed victims to be harangued on the stand (ref:  Appendix A para 6).

 

 

7.          Justice James Chawick:  Justice James Chadwick was allegedly brought into the trial by Justice McKinnon - after Justice McKinnon’s integrity and credibility had been brought into question by a witness.  I respectfully submit that the choice of Justice Chadwick was thereby brought into question, as was the integrity and credibility of Justice Chadwick.  Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, for unknown reasons,  Justice Chadwick was predisposed to grant the motion for stay.  Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick’s decision to stay was indicative of an indifference to the serious damage done to young boys who have been and will be victimized by sexual predators. Finally, I respectfully submit that the following conduct was demonstrative of Justice Chadwick’s serious judicial misconduct and bias:

 

a.  Justice Chadwick presided at the motion for stay (ref:  Appendix B para 1);

b.  Justice Chadwick refused to wait to have a key witness properly subpoenaed (ref:  Appendix B para 2);

c.  Justice Chadwick wilfully relied on hearsay and speculation to reach his verdict (ref:  Appendix B para 3).;

d.  Justice Chadwick made efforts to exonerate his fellow judge, Justice Colin McKinnon (ref:  Appendix B para 4);

e.  Justice Chadwick showed bias in opting against a mistrial (ref:  Appendix B para 5);

f.  Justice Chadwick’s order to stay proceedings was based on an inconsequential and benign contact of a witness with Perry Dunlop (ref:  Appendix B para 6).

 

8.          In light of the actions of Justices McKinnon and Chadwick, one is left pondering what, in the eyes of our legal system is the greater crime? ...sodomy and sexual abuse of young males? ...or, contact, however benign, with Perry Dunlop?  It seems that contact with Perry Dunlop, by a victim’s mother,  won this round.  Barring an appeal, Jacques Leduc, an alleged paedophile, is now a free man.  Barring an appeal, the victims are painted as liars who colluded and fabricated charges against Mr. Leduc.  Barring an appeal, a distraught victim’s mother has been found guilty for contacting Perry Dunlop.  Barring an appeal, Perry Dunlop has been tried and found guilty — in absentia — for answering his phone.  What does this all have to do with Jacques Leduc sodomizing and/or molesting and thereby destroying the lives of three young boys?  Absolutely nothing.


 

 

9.          Consequently, I respectfully request that your Council conduct an investigation into the conduct and behaviour of the two referenced judges.  In a community rife with concerns of cover-up, the conduct of the two judges in question does nothing to allay those concerns, and, in fact, raises additional concerns of cover-up extending into the judiciary.  With a number of Project Truth trials pending, tolerance of such judicial misconduct has serious ramifications and will raise genuine concerns regarding the selection of judges for all pending sex trials in Cornwall.  Therefore, I respectfully submit that it is imperative that this investigation be conducted in a public and timely fashion.

 

10.     Attached are three appendices which elaborate on the charges of judicial misconduct against Justices Colin McKinnon and James Chadwick, and provide a back grounder to contextualize those charges.

 

Awaiting your response, I remain,

Yours truly,

 

(Mrs.) Sylvia C. MacEachern

Phone: 613-831-5320     Fax: 613-831-5322

 

Enclosures:

Appendix A (Justice Colin McKinnon)

Appendix B (Justice James Chadwick)

Appendix C (Backgrounder)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CC:

The Honourable Anne McLellan, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada

The Honourable David Young, Attorney General for Ontario

Premier Michael Harris

Shelley Hallett, Crown Attorney

 

Appendix A

MacEachern letter of 09 April 2001

Justice Colin McKinnon

Justice Colin McKinnon did not recuse himself.

Justice McKinnon should not have presided at the Leduc trial.

In 1993, Jacques Leduc (then acting as legal counsel to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall) and Claude Shaver (then Chief of Police for the Cornwall Police Services) conspired with others to terminate a criminal investigation into allegations of sexual assault against a local Roman Catholic priest. At or about that time Mr. Leduc was party to arranging a financial payout to the alleged victim. It was later discovered that that payout included a gag order.

Shortly after the victim received the diocesan payout, Perry Dunlop, then a Constable with the Cornwall Police Services, discovered that his police force had terminated a criminal investigation into the allegations against the priest. As required by the Ontario Child and Family Services Act, Constable Dunlop advised the Children’s Aid Society (CAS) of the allegations and then disclosed the victim statement to that agency. Subsequently, Colin D. McKinnon, acting as legal counsel to the Cornwall Police Services, recommended that Constable Dunlop be charged under the Police Service Services Act for his actions. Shortly thereafter, Colin D. McKinnon, acting as legal counsel to former Chief Shaver, attempted to malign and discredit Constable Dunlop for his actions. Several years later, at the behest of Constable Dunlop, an OPP probe named Project Truth commenced an investigation into allegations of cover-up of a paedophile ring in Cornwall.

The stated mandate of Project Truth was to investigate historic and on-going paedophile activity in Cornwall. According to the mandate, the alleged suspects in the investigation included "prominent and respected citizens of Cornwall" including lawyers, clergy, probation officers, teachers and "a former Chief of Police." According to the mandate, Project Truth would also investigate allegations that "suspects were able to terminate investigations and prosecutions against them by abusing their positions of trust" and that "the Crown Attorney, the Diocese of Cornwall, and the Cornwall Police Services conspired to obstruct justice in these matters."

In other words, Justice McKinnon provided legal counsel to former Chief Shaver, a man suspected of conspiring to obstruct justice regarding the initial allegations of sex abuse. Furthermore, Justice McKinnon provided legal counsel to the Cornwall Police Service, an agency suspected of conspiring to obstruct with the Diocese of Cornwall (Jacques Leduc) regarding the initial allegations of sex abuse.

I respectfully submit that any "reasonable" person would deduce that in taking the Leduc trial, Justice McKinnon placed himself in a serious conflict of interest. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that the name Perry Dunlop is virtually synonymous with Project Truth. Therefore, I respectfully submit that, due to his prior activities as legal counsel to former Chief Shaver and the Cornwall Police Services, and due to his active attempts to legally discredit the conduct of Constable Dunlop, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to bear bias at a Project Truth trial. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due his attempts to vindicate the actions of former Chief Shaver and the Cornwall Police Service in an alleged cover-up, and due to the fact that that alleged cover-up entailed explicit attempts by Mr. Leduc to stifle sex abuse allegations against a local priest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to acquit Mr. Leduc. Justice McKinnon should have recused himself. He did not.

Justice McKinnon declined an opportunity to address his serious conflict of interest and recuse himself in the early days of the trial. At that time, Dick Nadeau, the operator of the projecttruth2.com web site, posted an article stating in part:

Justice McKinnon is relatively new to the bench, some four years I think. He is said to be a good judge. But prior to becoming a judge, he had a successful law practice. He was in fact the lawyer for our former Chief of Police Claude Shaver. He knows all about cover-ups over the Charlie/Ken Seguin affair. He knows about Cornwall’s troubles. He knows that Shaver is a paedophile and yet, had him as a client. Did he check his biases and prejudices at the door? So what does this judge bring to this trial? Am I concerned? You bet I am. Should he as the lawyers say, recuse himself from the bench? Can we expect him to be "fair and impartial"?

In response to the above posting, Justice McKinnon called Mr. Nadeau "a dangerous man" and charged him with contempt of court (22 January 2001).

I respectfully submit that, upon reading the above referenced posting on the web site, Justice McKinnon should have recognized his vulnerability. He should have recused himself. He did not.

Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon abused his judicial authority by charging Mr. Nadeau with contempt of court.

Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself when the name Perry Dunlop was introduced into testimony 07 February 2001. During his prior involvement as legal counsel to former Chief Shaver and the Cornwall Police Services, Justice McKinnon undertook actions directed at the person and conduct of Constable Dunlop. Those actions included, but were not limited to, the following:

Justice McKinnon advised the Cornwall Police Services to initiate legal action against Constable Dunlop through the Police Services Act;

When Constable Dunlop was exonerated of the above charges, Justice McKinnon advised that the decision be appealed;

Acting as legal counsel to retired Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon threatened legal action against Carson Chisholm whom he knew to be the brother-in-law of Constable Mr. Dunlop;

Acting as legal counsel to retired Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon threatened legal action against the Seaway News for, in part, printing a paragraph congratulating Perry Dunlop for giving a copy of the sexual abuse complaint to the Children’s Aid Society; and

Acting as legal counsel to retired Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon attempted to malign and discredit Constable Dunlop by advising the Seaway News that Constable Dunlop was then "under investigation for misconduct contrary to the Police Services Act."

I respectfully submit that, as witnessed above, during his prior activities as legal counsel in Cornwall, Justice McKinnon displayed animus against the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop. Consequently, Justice McKinnon should have recused himself when the name Perry Dunlop was first introduced into testimony. He did not.

Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself when defence honed in on the nature of a witness contact with Constable Dunlop. In fact, shortly after the name Perry Dunlop was introduced into testimony, the Crown objected that defence was eliciting hearsay regarding the Dunlop contact and requested a voir dire. Justice McKinnon overruled and permitted a limited line of questioning. Furthermore, Justice McKinnon personally drew attention to a witness statement which he thought might indicate a contradiction in the witness’ testimony.

I respectfully submit that throughout this entire portion of testimony Justice McKinnon never questioned defence as to the merit or relevance of occupying court time to pursue a particular witness contact. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, as evidenced by his rulings, Justice McKinnon aided and abetted defence to hone in and focus on a benign and irrelevant witness contact with former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in drawing attention to what he thought was a contradiction in the witness’ testimony, Justice McKinnon willfully attempted to assist the defence. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, throughout this entire portion of testimony — despite his prior legal involvement with former Constable Dunlop — Justice McKinnon never once indicated that the name Perry Dunlop rang a bell. Justice McKinnon should have recused himself. He did not.

Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself after defence filed an application for stay on 14 February 2001. The application for stay was filed one week after a victim’s mother testified that she had initiated a brief contact with Constable Perry Dunlop. The witness testified that she broke down at a welfare office because she just did not know what to do or where to turn regarding her son’s allegation that he was sexually molested by Mr. Leduc. The witness testified that a clerk at the welfare office suggested that she contact Constable Dunlop. A brief contact was made. The witness further testified that Constable Dunlop made one other call to her home to enquire about her son. A Project Truth officer was at her home when this contact was made. She informed the officer that she was speaking to Constable Dunlop.

As is typical of many communities, Cornwall had no agencies to provide guidance and support to male victims of sexual assault. Under those circumstances, the witness’ contact with Constable Dunlop was an effort by a distraught mother to seek guidance and/or support from anyone familiar with issues of male sexual molestation. Constable Dunlop was known to be such a person.

This understandable, brief and benign contact of a distraught mother with Constable Dunlop mushroomed into defence allegations of deliberate non-disclosure of a witness contact with Constable Dunlop. Defence relied on hearsay to charge that contact with Mr. Dunlop was an issue because Dunlop "is a man who’s involved with the corruption of the integrity of witnesses’ testimony." Defence again relied on hearsay to allege that Mr. Dunlop "made unauthorized contact with complainant witnesses on Project Truth cases" and coached witnesses "to give false or exaggerated testimony." In other words, in filing for the application to stay, defence focussed on the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop.

I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to exonerate Project Truth suspects by maligning former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to, and did, permit and readily embrace defamatory hearsay regarding the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop. Justice McKinnon should have recused himself when the application for stay was filed. He did not.

Justice McKinnon did not recuse himself prior to the commencement of the motion for stay 19 February 2001. The motion for stay was booked for one week. It was clear that the motion would focus largely on the conduct and person of former Constable Dunlop. It was also clear to courtroom observers that, in order to make the charge of non-disclosure relevant, defence would have to vilify Mr. Dunlop.

I respectfully submit that, because of his demonstrable animus against the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop ( ref. 1c), Justice McKinnon should not even have entertained the thought of presiding over the motion for stay. He should have recused himself. He did not.

Justice McKinnon should never have been selected/assigned to preside at the Leduc trial. For the past eight years the city of Cornwall has been rocked by allegations of paedophilia and related allegations of misconduct and cover-up involving members of the legal profession, the Roman Catholic Church, and the local police. Consequently, it was decided that all Project Truth trials would be handled by justices and Crowns residing outside the Cornwall jurisdiction. This decision was apparently made to ensure impartiality and allay citizen’s fears of judicial bias.

The Leduc trial was a Project Truth trial. Presumably Justice McKinnon was brought in from from Ottawa to ensure impartiality and to allay public fears about cover-up and potential judicial bias. In light of what is now known of Justice McKinnon’s prior activity in Cornwall, this begs two questions: (1) Was Justice McKinnon screened for prior legal/social activity in Cornwall? (2) Was Justice McKinnon asked if he had any prior legal and/or social dealings in Cornwall?

I respectfully question the process by which Justice McKinnon was selected/assigned to the Leduc trial. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that selecting/assigning Justice McKinnon to preside over the Leduc trial made a mockery of a process implemented, at least in part, to allay fears of judicial bias. Finally, I respectfully submit that, rightly or wrongly, selecting/assigning Justice McKinnon to preside over the Leduc trial has simply served to confirm public fears of rampant judicial bias.

Justice Colin McKinnon removed himself from the motion to stay only after a witness confronted him with concrete evidence of his, McKinnon’s, serious conflict of interest.

Justice McKinnon was prepared to preside over the motion to stay (19 February 2001). Mr. Dick Nadeau, the operator of the projecttruth2.com web site, was called as the first witness. Before taking the stand, Mr. Nadeau asked leave to address the court. Mr. Nadeau advised that he, Nadeau, had been cited for contempt by Justice McKinnon for previously questioning Justice McKinnon’s bias and possible conflict of interest. Mr. Nadeau then stated that he had letters written in 1994 in which Justice McKinnon threatened to sue Carson Chisholm, Perry Dunlop’s brother-in-law. Mr. Nadeau asked justice McKinnon to recuse himself.

Justice McKinnon appeared puzzled and said that he had no memory of such letters. He asked to see them. When the said letters were produced from a binder in the court they were handed over to the Crown. Justice McKinnon asked that they be read into the record. Both letters were written on legal letterhead. Both letters were signed by Colin D. McKinnon Q.C. Both letters were re Claude Shaver. One letter, dated 14 October 1994, was addressed to the publisher of the Seaway News. The other, dated 18 October 1994, was addressed to Carson Chisholm. Both letters threaten legal action. The letter to the Seaway News shows that Justice McKinnon was very familiar with the allegations of cover-up of sexual abuse allegations. It also shows that he was very familiar with the actions of the Cornwall Police Service and the conduct and person of Constable Perry Dunlop.

After the letters were read into the record, Justice McKinnon said that his memory was "refreshed somewhat." Shortly thereafter, Justice McKinnon indicated that "this was all very far out of my memory but I’m now refreshed" and added that it was no secret that he acted for Claude Shaver and the Cornwall Police Services.

Following a brief recess, Justice McKinnon advised that he may have forgotten other prior involvement regarding Dunlop and the Cornwall Police Service and that "the right thing for me to do" would be to review files at the police station "just to see whether there’s anything that may be there that could at some other time in this trial have an effect."

The following morning, Justice McKinnon reported that, although he had not yet accessed his own files, he found sufficient information at the police station to "refresh" his memory and that he had indeed had other involvement. That involvement entailed advising the Cornwall Police Service to initiate a series of legal actions against Constable Dunlop for disclosing the victim statement to the CAS. Justice McKinnon advised that Justice Chadwick would hear the application for stay.

I respectfully submit that, as evidenced above, until he was confronted with tangible proof to the contrary, Justice McKinnon wilfully feigned ignorance of his significant prior dealings with former Chief Shaver, the Cornwall Police Service and, in consequence, Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in feigning ignorance of his dealings with former Chief Shaver, Justice McKinnon was mindful that he should not have been presiding.

Justice McKinnon willfully attempted to feign ignorance of Perry Dunlop.

Justice McKinnon made a number of comments and/or queries regarding Perry Dunlop after his name, Dunlop’s, was introduced into testimony on 07 February 2001. While most of those comments or queries implied a personal ignorance of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop, others belied such ignorance. Examples of Justice McKinnon’s contradictory commentary include, but are not limited to, the following:

When the application for stay was filed (14 February 2001), Justice McKinnon repeatedly quizzed the Crown regarding Constable Dunlop’s contact with witnesses in other sex abuse cases. Those questions included, but were not limited to, the following:

"But I’m just wondering, through these years and all these [contacts with witnesses in other cases] was Constable Dunlop an officer still with Cornwall Police? Was he being paid?"

"But if he was holding himself out as a counsellor. Was he holding himself out as a counsellor at the same time he was a police officer sworn to [investigate]? Is that at the same time. . .Is that under investigation?...Is it ongoing?"

I respectfully submit that, in this instance, despite his first-hand knowledge of Constable Perry Dunlop, Justice McKinnon attempted to feign ignorance of the conduct and person of former Perry Dunlop.

On 15 February 2001, Justice McKinnon discussed an article which appeared in 19 February 2001 edition of The Report, a national weekly magazine. The article "No Closure in Cornwall" gave an overview of events which have transpired in Cornwall since former Constable Dunlop first happened on the sex abuse allegations against Father Charles MacDonald. The three-page article referenced the charges laid against Dunlop under the Ontario Police Services Act. and the subsequent appeal.

Justice McKinnon expressed his "tremendous concerns" that the Report article was "adulatory of Mr. Dunlop." Furthermore, Justice McKinnon stated "We are not living in Salem" and indicated that the court cannot permit continuance of pieces talking about alleged cover-up.

I respectfully submit that, despite his attempts to feign ignorance the previous day, Justice McKinnon’s above commentary was indicative of first-hand prejudicial knowledge of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop.

On 19 February 2001, after Dick Nadeau, the operator of the projecttruth2.com website confronted Justice McKinnon with two letters showing conflict of interest (ref. Appendix A para 2 above). At that time, Justice McKinnon stated: "When I came to this case there was no suggestion Dunlop would be involved in any way."

I respectfully submit that, in making the above statement, Justice McKinnon was trying to extricate himself from a difficult situation by indicating that, had he known Perry Dunlop would be involved in the trial he, McKinnon, would not have presided. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in making such a statement, Justice McKinnon inadvertently demonstrated a first-hand knowledge of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that in making the above statement Justice McKinnon was aware that he had been caught in a serious conflict of interest.

On 20 February 2001, after he had checked files at the police station, Justice McKinnon stated: "When the name Perry Dunlop came up in this trial, it was certainly going around in my mind. It certainly rang a bell."

I respectfully submit that, despite previous statements to the contrary (ref. Appendix A paras 3b and 3c above), Justice McKinnon was attempting to indicate that, until he checked the files at the police statement, he had no recall of his first-hand knowledge of the conduct and person of former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice McKinnon was trying to rationalize why he had not recused himself thirteen days earlier when the name Perry Dunlop was first introduced into testimony. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that it is extraordinary that Justice McKinnon could claim to have forgotten his radical legal counsel to the Cornwall Police Service regarding the conduct of Constable Dunlop.

On 20 February 2001, only moments after saying the name Perry Dunlop "rang a bell," Justice McKinnon stated: "None of us foresaw, in this case, that Perry Dunlop would be involved."

I respectfully submit that once again Justice McKinnon inadvertently demonstrated his first-hand knowledge of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop (ref. A3c). Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, until he was publicly confronted by a witness with tangible evidence to the contrary, Justice McKinnon wilfully attempted to feign ignorance of the conduct and person of Perry Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in attempting to feign ignorance of former Constable Dunlop, Justice McKinnon was mindful that he should not have been presiding. Finally, I respectfully and seriously question Justice McKinnon’s motive for remaining on the bench after 07 February 2001.

Justice McKinnon denied the victims their right to trial by jury.

Justice McKinnon claimed that information posted on an internet site broke a publication ban and thereby poisoned the jury pool (17 January 2001). Despite the fact that the information posted dealt with motions and technicalities regarding jury selection, Justice McKinnon claimed the material on the site "compromised the rights of both the Crown and the defence to a trial by jury." Justice McKinnon supported the defence request for trial by judge. The victims in the Leduc trial were denied their right to trial by jury.

I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest Justice McKinnon was predisposed to preside at the Leduc trial in a manner favourable to the defendant. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that a trial by judge alone was, under the circumstances, favourable to the accused. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his serious conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon used the internet incident as an excuse to proceed with a trial by judge. Finally, I respectfully submit that, if concerns that one internet posting could contaminate the entire jury pool in a city which has been awash with talk of paedophiles, and cover-ups and crooked lawyers for the past eight years, Justice McKinnon should have relocated the trial to another jurisdiction. He did not.

Justice McKinnon was predisposed to grant an application for stay which was based solely on the benign contact of a victim’s mother with former Constable Perry Dunlop.

During his prior legal involvements in Cornwall, Justice McKinnon engaged in legal actions directed at the conduct and person of Constable Dunlop. Those legal actions maligned the person and discredited the conduct of Constable Dunlop for attempting to ensure that sexual abuse allegations were properly investigated.

I respectfully submit that, during his prior legal actions in Cornwall, Justice McKinnon exhibited animus against the conduct and person of Constable Perry Dunlop. Consequently, I respectfully submit that Justice McKinnon was predisposed to discredit any actions of Constable Dunlop and to accept any hearsay or speculation regarding his conduct.

Defence filed an application for stay (14 February 2001) after a victim’s mother testified (07 February 2001) that she had initiated a brief and, I respectfully submit, benign, contact with former Constable Perry Dunlop. Defence, however, argued that "the defence has been irretrievably prejudiced" by what it termed "deliberate non-disclosure" of that contact.

I respectfully submit that a benign witness contact with former Constable Dunlop has no bearing whatever on whether or not Mr. Leduc did or did not sodomize and otherwise sexually molest the plaintiffs in this trial. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that a witness contact with Constable Dunlop can be construed as malignant only if one embraces the unsubstantiated, defamatory and fallacious innuendo that Perry Dunlop is a conspirator who fabricates stories of sexual abuse, forces men to perjure themselves, and willingly forfeits his career, financial security, friendships, and reputation for the pleasure of seeing innocent men charged and convicted. I respectfully submit that, due to his prior conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon was predisposed to, and did, embrace such fallacious innuendo without question.

During the application to stay, Justice McKinnon cut into the Crown’s address. When the Crown said "the defence will be arguing that because of a propensity on the part of Constable Dunlop to intervene," Justice McKinnon cut in: "To intervene with witnesses and infect them or have them exaggerate their testimony or move forward with legal proceedings."

I respectfully submit that the application for stay was permitted to proceed because Justice McKinnon was predisposed, as evidenced by his own words, to vilify the actions of Mr. Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice McKinnon’s demonstrable bias and defamatory and unsubstantiated statements should have sufficed to have him removed from the bench and a mistrial declared.

Justice McKinnon allowed victims to be harangued on the stand.

Throughout the proceedings, Justice McKinnon displayed bias and prejudice by favouring objections put forth by the defence. Such examples of bias and prejudice included, but were not limited to, the following:

During cross-examination of the first victim the tearful, humiliated and confused 20-year-old victim was mercilessly harangued by the defence. When the Crown attempted to object, Justice McKinnon stated: "This witness is 20 years old. He is not a child."

When the Crown attempted to object again, Justice McKinnon snapped: "I’m going to suggest that you’re on your feet too much. Quite frankly I find it disturbing."

I respectfully submit that both interventions referenced above reflect Justice McKinnon’s lack of empathy for male victims of sex abuse. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, due to his prior conflict of interest, Justice McKinnon’s attitude toward the victims was indicative of a predisposed prejudice for the accused paedophile, Mr. Leduc.

Appendix B to

MacEachern letter of 09 April 2001

Justice James Chadwick

Justice James Chadwick presided at the motion for stay.

Justice Chadwick was called in to the Leduc trial 21 February 2001 after the sitting judge, Justice Colin McKinnon, was forced to recuse himself from a motion to stay proceedings. The trial had commenced 15 January 2002. In other words, several weeks of testimony had transpired before Justice Chadwick took the bench. Consequently, Justice Chadwick was deprived of critical information and knowledge with which to situate the conduct, demeanor and testimony of the witnesses against the serious allegations of non-disclosure put forth by defence.

I respectfully submit that, due to his absence from the courtroom for the weeks of prior testimony, Justice Chadwick was incapable of situating the allegation of non-disclosure within the context of the surrounding testimony. Therefore, I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick, or any judge for that matter, was incapable of rendering a just decision regarding the import of a brief and benign witness contact with former Constable Dunlop. Justice McKinnon should have done the honourable thing and, for the sake of justice, called a mistrial. Justice Chadwick should not have presided at the motion for stay.

Justice Chadwick refused to wait to have a key witness properly subpoened.

In filing for the application to stay, defence alleged deliberate non-disclosure of a witness contact with former Constable Perry Dunlop.

Justice Chadwick took the bench at the Leduc trial 21 February 2001. At that time, he stated that, aside from what he had heard on CBC radio that morning, he knew very little about the case.

Former Constable Dunlop was obviously a key witness for the motion. Despite his stated lack of familiarity with the circumstances surrounding the motion, and the issue of former Constable Dunlop as related to that motion, Justice Chadwick curtly declined the Crown’s offer to assist defence to properly subpoena Perry Dunlop as a witness. Justice Chadwick stated that that would take over a week. Justice Chadwick’s response implied that either he or the trial could not spare those additional days. Consequently, Mr. Dunlop was not present to defend the attack on his conduct and person which transpired throughout the motion to stay. Nor was Mr. Dunlop present to counter the hearsay, speculation and improbable theories put forth by the defence.

I respectfully submit that, given Justice Chadwick’s self-stated lack of familiarity with the trial, his impatience to proceed portrayed a remarkable indifference to the pursuit of justice. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, had Mr. Dunlop been properly subpoenaed, the facts regarding his notes and conduct would have been ascertained and the motion to stay would have been deemed groundless and frivolous and therefore denied. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that because Justice Chadwick refused to allot the necessary time required to properly subpoena Perry Dunlop, a suspected paedophile has been set "free."

Justice Chadwick willfully relied on hearsay and speculation to reach his verdict.

Hearsay: The motion to stay focused on the conduct and person of former Constable Perry Dunlop, his notes and his willsay. As stated above, Justice Chadwick refused to have Perry Dunlop properly subpoenaed to take the stand. Consequently Mr. Dunlop did not appear as a key witness.

In his reasons for granting the application for stay, Justice Chadwick made reference to the following points:

Former Constable Dunlop counselled a victim in another trial to change his evidence;

The testimony of Project Truth officers regarding their contacts with Mr. Dunlop; and

The testimony of a victim’s mother regarding her brief contact with former Constable Dunlop.

I respectfully submit that the testimony referenced above, and countless other allegations put forth by defence, were hearsay. I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick relied on hearsay because he was unwilling to take the necessary time required to properly subpoena Mr. Dunlop. Therefore, I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick willfully relied on hearsay to grant the application for stay.

Speculation: In his reasons for granting the application for stay, Justice Chadwick made specific reference to the following:

Suspicion regarding the notes of former Constable Dunlop ("When one looks at the notes of Perry Dunlop, one becomes suspicious as to when entries were actually made and whether they are complete.");

Speculation that former Constable Dunlop contacted the Leduc victims ( "It would be logical to conclude that Dunlop would have pursed the complainants in the Leduc case.");

Speculation that the victims and other witnesses colluded with each other ("defence suggest collusion amongst the witnesses in the Leduc case"); and

Speculation that the victims and witness colluded with former Constable Dunlop ("defence suggest collusion amongst the witnesses in the Leduc case both with each other and with outside interests.").

I respectfully submit that all of the testimony referenced above was groundless speculation. I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick relied on groundless speculation because he was unwilling to take the necessary time required to properly subpoena Mr. Dunlop. Therefore, I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick willfully relied on groundless speculation to grant the application for stay.

Justice Chadwick made efforts to exonerate his fellow judge, Justice Colin McKinnon.

Justice Colin McKinnon was forced to recuse himself from the motion for stay after he was publicly confronted — for a second time — with his serious conflict of interest. Until he was forced to address that conflict, Justice McKinnon attempted to feign ignorance of the conduct and person of former Constable Perry Dunlop.

On 21 February 2001 Justice McKinnon announced that Justice Chadwick would preside at the motion to stay. Justice McKinnon also verbalized his intent to return to the trial if the motion for stay was unsuccessful.

On 01 March 2001 the stay was granted. In his reasons for granting the stay, Justice Chadwick made the two following statements:

"I am sure if the trial judge had known of Dunlop’s involvement before the trial began, he would have declined the assignment"; and

"Now that Dunlop is relevant to the Leduc case, the trial judge in all likelihood would have to recuse himself from the trial and declare a mistrial."

I respectfully submit that, given the extraordinary circumstances which forced Justice McKinnon’s temporary recusal, it was highly inappropriate for Justice Chadwick to make excusatory commentary on Justice McKinnon’s behalf. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, contrary to Justice Chadwick’s thought, Justice McKinnon showed no indication of recusing himself and declaring a mistrial and, in fact, had indicated his intent to return to the bench should the trial resume. Finally, I respectfully submit that, in granting the stay, Justice Chadwick was attempting in part to exonerate Justice McKinnon by sparing him the embarrassment of recusal and the concurrent legal disgrace of declaring a mistrial.

Justice Chadwick showed bias in opting against a mistrial.

Justice Chadwick indicated that he opted against calling a mistrial because 18 of 26 witnesses had testified.

I respectfully submit that it is unconscionable and illogical that an accused paedophile is allowed to ‘walk’ because 18 of 26 witnesses have already testified.

Justice Chadwick indicated that he opted against a mistrial because it would be "a tremendous hardship" on the victims and other witnesses to testify again.

I respectfully submit that the hardship of testifying again would be minimal in contrast to the hardship of being viewed by the community and judiciary as liars. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that every sex abuse trial is a tremendous hardship on the victims and their families; that has never been viewed as just cause to shun the pursuit of justice and thereby endanger the community.

Justice Chadwick indicated that he opted against a mistrial because he believed "the contentious publicity has caused [Mr. Leduc] and his family a great deal of grief and hardship."

I respectfully submit that the contentious publicity caused the victims and their families a great deal of hardship. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick’s expression of sympathy for an accused paedophile showed a callous indifference to the families of victims who were present in the courtroom.

Justice Chadwick indicated he opted against a mistrial because of his concern for the financial strain on Mr. Leduc.

I respectfully submit that the trial created a serious financial strain for the victims and their families, none of whom are lawyers. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Mr. Leduc personally chose to increase his legal fees by retaining the services of a Toronto-based defence team. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that it is incredible that Justice Chadwick would even consider throwing out a trial because of his concerns for the financial well-being of an accused paedophile.

Justice Chadwick opted against a mistrial because "There have been too many innocent people improperly convicted in both Canada and the United States as a result of unfair trial procedures" and the accused "is entitled to a fair and proper trial within a reasonable period of time."

I respectfully submit that, in making the former part of the above statement, Justice Chadwick inferred that Mr. Leduc was innocent. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick was in no position to make such an inference. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, in making that comment, Justice Chadwick implied that the victims and their families are liars. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that this may well be one of the cases where the guilty are set free because of unfair trial procedures.

Justice Chadwick’s order to stay proceedings was based on an inconsequential and benign contact of a witness with Perry Dunlop.

In citing his reasons for judgement of "wilful" non-disclosure by the Crown, Justice Chadwick referred to former Constable Dunlop as "a self-appointed investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner" and talked of "Dunlop’s vigilante approach" whereby "the end justifies the means."

Justice Chadwick also stated that a victim in another case "was counselled by Dunlop to change his evidence." Justice Chadwick then quoted from a transcript to substantiate this hearsay. The transcript, however, did nothing to substantiate the serious allegation.

I respectfully submit that there was absolutely no substantiation or evidence for the ruling of "willful" non-disclosure against the Crown. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that no "reasonable" person would deduce that non-disclosure of a benign contact by a distraught victim’s mother with a man known publicly for his integrity and familiarity with male sexual abuse had any bearing upon whether Mr. Leduc did, or did not, sodomize and/or otherwise sexually molest the victims.

During the trial, a victim’s mother testified that she had initiated a brief contact with Constable Perry Dunlop. That contact was initiated after the distraught mother broke down at a welfare office. The break down transpired because the woman was concerned about her son and she didn’t know where to go or what to do. A clerk at the welfare office advised her to call Constable Dunlop. Constable Dunlop was then known as man who understood the difficulties facing male sex abuse victims. Cornwall was lacking any agencies or persons to meet that particular and very unique need.

Justice Chadwick was not present in the courtroom to see or hear the woman as she testified. He was, however, presiding at the motion for stay which evolved from her testimony. The object of the motion was to prove that non-disclosure of a witness contact (i.e., the victim’s mother) with Mr. Dunlop denied Mr. Leduc his charter rights "to make full answer and defence."

The defence’s argument of "wilful" non-disclosure of this benign contact was relevant only if one was prepared to ascribe to the highly speculative, fallacious and defamatory notion regarding the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop outlined previously (ref. Appendix A para 5b above).

I respectfully submit that Justice Chadwick, for unknown reasons, bore animus against the conduct and person of former Constable Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that, for unknown reasons, Justice Chadwick willfully embraced a highly speculative, fallacious and defamatory notion regarding the conduct and person of Mr. Dunlop. Furthermore, I respectfully submit that because Justice Chadwick willfully vilified Mr. Dunlop, an alleged paedophile is "free."

Appendix C to MacEachern letter of 09 April 2001

Back grounder

Charges against Jacques Leduc were laid through the OPP probe known as Project Truth. Project Truth was launched in August 1997 to investigate the persistent allegations of then Constable Perry Dunlop (Cornwall Police) regarding a cover-up and existence of a paedophile ring in Cornwall.

The stated mandate of Project Truth is as follows:

This investigation is being conducted into paedophile activity both historic and ongoing in the Cornwall, Ontario area. The alleged suspects are prominent and respected citizens of Cornwall, and include lawyers, Catholic priests, a Catholic bishop, teachers, probation officers, businessmen, a former Chief of Police and the present Crown attorney. The alleged offences occurred and are occurring both in the City of Cornwall and the outlying area.

In addition, it is alleged the suspects were able to terminate investigations and prosecutions against them by abusing their positions of trust within the community. It is alleged the Crown Attorney, the Diocese of Cornwall, and the Cornwall Police Service conspired to obstruct justice in these matters.

The allegations of cover-up and a paedophile ring in Cornwall arose after Constable Dunlop discovered, in late September 1993, that his police force (Cornwall Police Service), then headed by one Chief Claude Shaver, had terminated an investigation into sex abuse allegations against a local Roman Catholic priest (Father Charles MacDonald) and a local probation officer (Ken Seguin). The victim, a former altar boy, took his complaint to the Cornwall Police Service 09 December 1992. Ten months prior to that date, the victim had approached officials of the Alexandria-Cornwall Diocese seeking an apology. After realizing that no apology was forthcoming, the victim turned to the police.

The former altar boy alleges that he settled with the diocese only after he was advised by Cornwall Police Service that no charges would be laid against Father MacDonald. The former altar boy further alleges that he believed the financial settlement was a form of acknowledgment of the priest’s guilt.

Jacques Leduc, the defendant in the Leduc trial, is both a lawyer and a canon lawyer. As legal counsel to the Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall, Mr. Leduc was present during diocesan discussions with the former altar boy. As legal counsel to the diocese, Mr. Leduc was actively involved in arranging the settlement with the alleged victim. As legal counsel for the diocese, Mr. Leduc translated documents used by the diocese for similar settlements. As legal counsel for the diocese, Mr. Leduc worked on the settlement with Malcolm MacDonald, a former Q.C. and lawyer for the suspect paedophile, Father Charles MacDonald.

The victim was paid $32,000 in hush money by the Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall. The paperwork accompanying the agreement was dated 02 September 1993.

Malcolm MacDonald was later charged and found guilty of obstruction of justice for his role in the illegal deal. He received an absolute discharge. That same Malcolm MacDonald was later charged with two counts of indecent assault and one count of gross indecency. He died before trial.

On 23 September 1993 Constable Dunlop inadvertently happened on the victim statement of the former altar boy. .

Shortly after he saw the victim statement Dunlop was advised that the victim had settled with the diocese. Because of his concern for the safety of the children in Cornwall, Constable Dunlop fulfilled his legal obligations according to the Ontario Child and Family Services Act by contacting and then disclosing the victim statement to the Children’s Aid Society (CAS).

Despite initial denials by the Diocese to the contrary, it was eventually learned that the victim had been required to sign a gag order. The victim was also required to present a prepared statement to the Cornwall Police Service advising police "to close your file and stop further proceedings."

In March 1996, five years after the Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall was advised of the sex abuse allegations against Father Charles MacDonald, and nearly four years after those same allegations were taken to the Cornwall Police Service, Father Charles MacDonald was charged with seven counts of indecent assault against three former altar boys. Father MacDonald now faces multiple charges by a number of alleged victims. He has yet to go to trial.

It is known that Chief Shaver, Ken Seguin, Father Charles MacDonald, Malcolm MacDonald and Bishop Eugene Larocque (Bishop of the Diocese of Alexandria-Cornwall) were friends and met on a social basis. It is also reported that, in the late summer or early Fall of 1993 a group met at the summer residence of Malcolm MacDonald to discuss the termination of the criminal sex abuse investigation of Father Charles MacDonald and Ken Seguin. Among those allegedly present at the gathering were Father Charles MacDonald, Ken Seguin, Bishop Eugene Larocque, Malcolm MacDonald, Chief Claude Shaver and Jacques Leduc.

Shortly after this meeting, Ken Seguin committed suicide and Chief Claude Shaver announced his early retirement effective January 1994.

In January 1994 Dunlop came under serious scrutiny by his own police force for disclosing the victim statement to the CAS. Colin McKinnon Q.C., — then an Ottawa lawyer, now Justice Colin McKinnon — advised that legal action be taken against Const. Dunlop.

Dunlop was charged with discreditable conduct under the Police Services Act. On 23 September 1994 a Board of Inquiry was held in Ottawa. Const. Dunlop was exonerated. On the advice of Colin McKinnon, the decision was appealed. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

After his early retirement Chief Claude Shaver retained Colin McKinnon as legal counsel.

In a two-page letter to the Seaway News (14 October 1994) Colin McKinnon threatened legal action because, according to McKinnon, a paragraph in the publication’s 03 October 1994 edition was libellous and implied "that Claude Shaver is a person of bad character who participated in ‘sweeping under the rug’ sexual abuse allegations." According to McKinnon, the libel was exacerbated by the fact that the defamatory words "are in fact the words of Carson Chisholm who happens to be the brother-in-law of Const. Perry Dunlop. . . .a person presently facing a public inquiry for misconduct contrary to the Police Services Act." Another letter signed by Colin McKinnon (18 October 1994) accused Carson Chisholm with defaming Claude Shaver and threatened legal action.

By 1996 Dunlop had become known as a sympathetic and understanding point of contact for male victims of sexual abuse. Dunlop and his wife Helen became a source of strength for these troubled souls. Through these many contacts Dunlop came to believe and charge that there was a cover-up involving a "clan" of paedophiles operating in Cornwall.

Project Truth was launched in the summer of 1997. The probe was a response solely to Dunlop’s persistent allegations of a cover-up involving a paedophile clan operating in Cornwall.

In 1998, Jacques Leduc was charged with twelve counts of sexual assault. More charges were added at a later date.

In 1999, Malcolm MacDonald was charged three counts of sexual assault.

To date over 800 witnesses have been interviewed by Project Truth. In total there are 68 suspects, 15 men charged and 26 suspects dead. It is my understanding that the files of the remaining 27 suspects are in the offices of the Crown Attorney. Apart from the Project Truth probe, at least six other Cornwall men have been charged with sexual assault against young males.

Note: In response, the Canadian Judicial Council, on July 17th, 2004, reported that it found nothing wrong either with the conduct of the judges or the conduct of the trial. The Ontario Court of Appeal thought much differently.